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OBSTACLES TO CREDIT RATING AGENCIES'
FIRST AMENDMENT DEFENSE
IN LIGHT OF ABU DHABI
Parisa Haghshenas*
There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion.
There's the United States and there's Moody's Bond Rating
Service. The United States can destroy you by dropping bombs,
and Moody's can destroy you by downgrading your bonds. And
believe me, it's not clear sometimes who's more powerful.'
INTRODUCTION
The nature of today's financial markets necessitates
interconnectedness among various market participants. One
participant, the rating agency, has become one of the most
influential by providing its perspective, in the form of ratings, on
the viability of certain financial products.2 The fundamental
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1. Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two
Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 619, 620
(1999) [hereinafter Two Thumbs Down] (quoting The News Hour with Jim
Lehrer: Interview with Thomas L. Friedman (PBS television broadcast Feb. 13,
1996)).
2. FRANK PARTNOY, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS,
RETHINKING REGULATION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES: AN INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE 2, 5 (2009), http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/CRA
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purpose of a rating is to ensure market efficiency through the rating
agency's description of which products are riskier than others. This
creates a shield of investor protection and becomes a source of
market confidence. Yet in the current financial crisis, rating
agencies have come under attack by investors who claim that the
agencies not only failed to protect the investors, but were
instrumental contributors to the financial crisis itself.3  Under
attack, the ratings agencies are claiming that their ratings of various
financial instruments-analogized to editorials or, more
appropriately, restaurant reviews-are entitled to full First
Amendment protection. Yet, the agencies' activities have formed a
type of institutional commingling that has been exacerbated by the
conflicts of interest embedded in the ratings process. As a result,
ratings agencies should be denied First Amendment protection.
In an effort to project marketability of their security
issuances and themselves, market participants are encouraged, and
sometimes obliged, to use the same rating agencies. This results in
unavoidable reliance on the agencies and a financial market
characterized by a commingling of institutions. The rating agencies'
need for self-preservation has shifted the focus from investor
protection and market confidence to self-aggrandizement, which
results in scores of litigation disputing the level of risk the rating
agencies assigned in their ratings. When these ratings have been
challenged in litigation, the rating agencies have asserted that their
ratings are protected as opinions under the First Amendment. This
Note will address the rating agencies' First Amendment defense
through the lens of Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan
Stanley4 and will highlight the conflicts of interest embedded in the
rating process that should preclude the rating agencies from
obtaining such protection.
WhitePaper04-14-09.pdf [hereinafter RETHINKING REGULATION]
("Regulatory dependence on ratings created higher demand for ratings").
3. Id. at 6-7 (noting that the "President's Working Group on Financial
Markets... criticized the flaws in the rating agencies' assessments of complex
products and called them a 'principal underlying cause' of the recent financial
crisis).
4. 651 F. Supp. 2d 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
Part I of this Note details the Abu Dhabi ruling, which
represents one court's reluctance to grant First Amendment
protection to ratings issued by a rating agency. Part II traces the
history of the rating agencies and the past and present regulatory
oversight, or lack thereof, of such agencies. Part III of this Note is a
detailed discussion of the Abu Dhabi court's analysis and of the
claim that the court's analysis should be applied to all issues rated
by the rating agencies, not just those that are private placements.
In applying the court's analysis to all ratings issued by the rating
agencies, this Note explores the stark contrast between those
ratings and the newspaper editorials to which they are often
analogized as a defense. The final part of this Note discusses
potential regulatory solutions to the issues posed by rating agencies
in the current economic crisis, and reiterates the need to regain
market confidence and to increase investor protection.
I. ABu DHABI COMMERCIAL BANK V. MORGAN STANLEY
In 2009, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank (Abu Dhabi) filed
suit against Moody's Investors Service, Inc. (Moody's), Standard &
Poor's Ratings Services (S&P) (collectively the "rating agencies"),
and seven other defendants for losses incurred from the sale of
notes issued by the Cheyne Finance PLC structured investment
vehicle (SIV), which were rated by the named rating agencies.6 The
notes were issued via a private placement memorandum and the
issuance necessitated the assignment of ratings. The success of the
SIVs "depend[ed] directly on the credit quality of the assets
5. Private placements, or "nonpublic offerings," are "securities [that] are
offered only to sophisticated investors in a nonpublic manner."
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS,
PRIVATE PLACEMENTS: COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK (SECTION 411) 1 (1990),
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/PrivatePlacel.pdf. Under the
Securities Act of 1933, issuers of private placement securities are exempted
from registration requirements. Id.
6. Abu Dhabi, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 163 (listing the plaintiffs' theories of
recovery as "common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligence,
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract and related contract claims, unjust
enrichment, and aiding and abetting").
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acquired by the SIV." ' The plaintiffs alleged, among other things,
that although the private placements were risky and complex
investments, the rating agencies evaluated them as relatively safe
investments, and those investments are now worthless." Although
this is not the first case to address rating agencies' liability for
ratings assigned to various financial instruments, 9 it does concern
the default of residential mortgage-backed securities, which have
been called contributing factors to the recent financial crisis.'
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that
ratings are protected as opinions under the First Amendment."
Specifically, they asserted that "Rating Agencies gather and
analyze information about issuers, form opinions about that
information and disseminate their forward-looking opinions to the
public." 12 The court denied the motion, holding that the plaintiffs
"sufficiently alleged that the ratings issued by the Rating Agencies
on the Rated Notes are actionable misstatements"'' 3 and cannot be
afforded protection under the First Amendment. 4 In denying the
defendant's motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds, the
court relied on a number of factors: the nature of the product sold
to investors, 5 the state of mind and knowledge of the rating
7. Complaint at 10, Abu Dhabi, 65t F. Supp. 2d 155 (No. 08 Civ. 7508),
[hereinafter First Amended Complaint].
8. Id. at 1-2.
9. See infra Part lII.A.
10. See JEROME S. FONS, WHITE PAPER ON RATING COMPETITION AND
STRUCTURED FINANCE 1 (2008), http://www.fonsrisksolutions.com/Documents
/Ratings%20White%20Paper.pdf ("Faulty ratings on securities backed by
subprime mortgages are believed responsible for billions of dollars in losses.").
11. Joint Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion of the Rating
Agency Defendants to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint at 1-3, Abu
Dhabi, 651 F. Supp. 2d 155 (No. 08 Civ. 2508 (SAS)) [hereinafter Joint
Memorandum].
12. Id. at 26.
13. Abu Dhabi, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 176. Applying the standard required
in reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must "accept as true all of the
factual allegations contained in the complaint .. " Id. at 170 (citing Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 572 (2007)).
14. Id. at 175-76.
15. Id.
agencies when they rated the notes, 16 and the conflicts of interest
between the rating agency and the issuer of the notes. 7
The court relied on the nature of the notes as "'private
placement[s]" ''  as grounds to deny First Amendment protection.
Specifically, the court stated that "where a rating agency has
disseminated their ratings to a select group of investors rather than
to the public at large, the rating agency is not afforded the same
protection."' 9 The court noted further that even if the ratings are
classified as "opinions," they are still actionable since the rating
agencies had clear knowledge that they were misleading
prospective investors.2 '
The court's holding centered on the conflicts of interests
that existed between the rating agencies and the issuer of the notes.
The court referred to a number of criteria in determining the
existence of conflicts of interest: the rating agency's level of
involvement with the structuring of the note prior to its issuance,
the initial and ongoing fee structures associated with the ratings,
and the rating agency's motive to assign higher (and thus better)
ratings. 2 Although the court noted that the "existence of conflicts
of interest alone typically is not sufficient to establish that
defendants 'knowingly' made a false and misleading statement, 22 it
is influential in determining the rating agencies' lack of belief in the
issued ratings when combined with other factors. 23 The presence of
16. Id at 178-80.
17. Id.
18. First Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 78. See supra text
accompanying note 5.
19. Abu Dhabi, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 176 (comparing the ratings of private
placement issuances to the "specific business audience" composed of five
subscribers in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 761-62 (1985)).
20. Id. ("[Tihe Rating Agencies did not genuinely or reasonably believe
that the ratings they assigned to the Rated Notes were accurate and had a
basis in fact."); see also id. at 178 (stating further that the rating agencies
"knew that [the structured investment portfolio] consisted of 'much more'
than fifty-five percent of RMBS ... [which] made the SIV a risky investment
and certainly not deserving of high ratings").
21. Id. at 166-67, 179-80.
22. Id. at 179.
23. Id. Because the rating agencies:
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these conflicts of interest highlights the distinction between a rating
agency and a journalist, thus supporting the court's decision to deny
First Amendment protection to the rating agencies.
The court was justified in denying First Amendment
protection to the rating agencies, despite widespread sentiment to
the contrary.14 The apparent depth of the conflicts of interest and
the requirement imposed by regulators that institutions use only
preapproved rating agencies2 5 cast doubt upon the defense that
these ratings, like journalists' opinions, should be protected under
the First Amendment. In essence, a rating agency is acting like a
chef rating his own food, 6 and these conflicts of interest, or the
perception thereof, dilute the independence of the rating agencies.
In order to grasp the extent of subjectivity embedded in the rating
process, a brief history of rating agencies and the changes in their
business models is warranted.
knew that the ratings process was flawed, knew that the
portfolio was not a safe, stable investment, and knew that
Ratings Agencies could not issue an objective rating
because of the effect it would have on their compensation,
it may be plausibly inferred that ... the Rating Agencies
knew they were disseminating false and misleading
ratings.
Id.
24. See Gregory Husisian, What Standard of Care Should Govern the
World's Shortest Editorials?: An Analysis of Bond Rating Agency Liability, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 411, 453-54 (1990) ("It is apparent, therefore, that bond
ratings are indeed the world's shortest editorials ... courts should grant them
the same deference they grant any other protected first amendment
publication. Ratings merely provide a simple means for consumers to
compare rough levels of risk among varying companies and industries.").
25. See discussion infra Part II.
26. See On the Media: Grade Inflation (NPR radio broadcast May 29,
2009) (interview by Brooke Gladstone with David Grais and Floyd Abrams),
available at http://www.onthemedia.org/transcripts/2009/05/29/03; see also
Deryn Darcy, Survey, Credit Rating Agencies and the Credit Crisis: How the
"Issuer Pays" Conflict Contributed and What Regulators Might Do About It,
2009 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 605, 622 (2009) (noting that credit rating agencies
"receive approximately 90 to 95% of their annual revenues from issuer fees")
(citing Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 50
(2004)).
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II. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCIAL
PRODUCT RATINGS
The idea of rating securities and debt instruments existed in
the financial markets as early as 1837.27 The ratings that emerged
soon began to resemble those that are available today. For
example, in the early 1900s, John Moody published "Moody's
Analyses of Railroad Investments. 2 8 Moody's continues to publish
an updated version of this reference guide. The publication
included a list of the U.S. Railroad bonds rated by the company and
their corresponding valuations defined in "rating" terms.2 9 These
terms and their definitions were displayed at the beginning of each
publication issued.:' Moody's and other rating agencies have
progressed over the years to rating a number of other financial
products.3' Moody's and most of the other rating agencies maintain
the following classification scale in their ratings: AAA, AA, A,
BAA, BA, B, CAA, CA, and C.3 The further right you proceed on
27. See Amy K. Rhodes, The Role of the SEC in the Regulation of the
Rating Agencies: Well-Placed Reliance or Free-Market Interference?, 20 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 293, 300 (1996) (discussing the role of the ratings agencies in
the financial industry and their subsequent growth as markets began to
expand).
28. See FONS, supra note 10, at 1-2 (discussing the historical background
of rating agencies and their current effects on the mortgage industry).
29. See MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, MOODY'S RATING SYMBOLS AND
DEFINITIONS 6 (2007), available at http://www.moodys.com/cust/content/
Content.ashx?source=StaticContent/Free% 20Pages/Products% 20and%20Ser
vices/Downloadable % 20Files/RatingSymbolsDefinitions.pdf.
30. See id. (providing an in-depth view of Moody's various ratings and
their corresponding definitions, including a discussion of the types of
investments rated by the corporation).
31. See Frank Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary
Cause of the Crisis, in THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO AND THE
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, CREDIT MARKET TURMOIL OF 2007-08:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 3, http:/www.law.yale.eduldocuments/
pdf/cbl/partnoy-overdependence-credit.pdf.
32. MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, supra note 29, at 29. See also U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND
FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE
SECURITIES MARKETS 25 (2003), available at http://sec.gov/news/studies/
458 [Vol. 8
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this line, the lower the product is rated. These one-to-three-letter
terms become crucial to a product's viability in the marketplace, as
investors are often less inclined to purchase-and sometimes
forbidden from purchasing- lower-rated products than higher-
rated ones.3 3 These ratings signify the underlying issuer's credit-
worthiness, or how likely or able the underlying issuer is to pay its
debts to its creditors and to its investors.34 Naturally, the higher the
rating assigned to a specific financial product, the more attractive it
becomes and the easier it is to promote.
Historically, the fee structure instituted by rating agencies
was straightforward: the agencies would not charge a fee to rate an
issuer or debt instrument, but would raise revenue through
advertisements and subscriptions to their publications. This
model of amassing revenue is not unlike the process employed by
today's newspaper conglomerates. Yet unlike newspapers, the
credratingreport03.pdf [hereinafter OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES
MARKETS] (noting that Fitch and S&P ratings "AAA, AA, A, and BBB are
investment grade categories, BB, B, CCC, CC, C, and D are considered
speculative grade rankings").
33. See generally Brian J. M. Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and
The Financial Crisis of 2008, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus., 549, 585 (2009) (noting the
"high degree of confidence that market participants placed on the value of an
AAA rating").
34. See OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 32, at 5
(noting that "the Commission has relied on ratings by market-recognized
credible rating agencies for distinguishing among grades of creditworthiness");
Francis A. Bottini, Jr., Comment, An Examination of the Current State of
Rating Agencies and Proposals for Limited Oversight of Such Agencies, 30 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 579, 582 (1993) ("An estimated seventy-nine percent of
individual investors claim that a rating is the most important factor in their
investment decision.") See also id. ("In addition, major governmental agencies
• . . increasingly rely on ratings in promulgating major securities regulations.
For example, the SEC recently prohibited the investment of money-market
funds in commercial paper with a low rating." (footnotes omitted)).
35. See Fitch. Inc. v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc., 330 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir.
2003) (noting, specifically in reference to Fitch Ratings Insurance Group, that
one of the reasons issuers prefer a "favorable rating [is because] that rating
makes it easier to sell the security to investors, who rely upon Fitch's analysis
and evaluation").
36. Lawrence White, Will Recent Reform Increase Competition?: A New
Law for the Bond Rating Industry, REGULATION, Spring 2007, 48, 48-49.
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rating agencies now charge a fee to the issuers for the ratings they
issue, a process which began in the 1970s.17  To provide a
comparison, this would be like a newspaper journalist charging a
high fee to provide an "independent" rating of an exclusive hotel in
New York City and then publishing the review in the Travel
portion of the newspaper. This publication would be something
more than a simple advertisement since the rating is a de facto
endorsement of the hotel. Although merely charging a fee for
services rendered may not automatically bias the rating, it does
create the appearance of improper influence. This characteristic of
the new era of rating agencies would soon become a deciding factor
in many court decisions as the rating agencies' appearance of
independency diminished.:'
By the time the new fee structures were implemented, the
Great Depression and a deteriorating economic environment had
changed the economic landscape, which was in turn offset by an
increasing development of corporate bond structures in the United
States.:9  Furthermore, by the late 1900s, rating agencies were
profiled as playing a major role in the financial stability of the
markets by "supplementing if not actually taking over functions
once performed by investment bankers." Therefore, "their
reputational capital grew. '4 As a result of the economy's sudden
dependence on the rating agencies, their ratings became
37. Id. at 49. See generally Rhodes, supra note 27, at 308-09 (noting that
the "issuer pays" model comprises a large amount of revenue for the rating
agencies; "for example, four-fifths of S&P's [revenue] is derived from issuer
fees") (citing Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, The Credit Rating Industry, 19
FRBNY Q. REV. 1, 4 (1994), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/
quarterly-review/1994v19/vl 9n2articlel.pdf ).
38. See Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley, 651 F. Supp. 2d
155, 164-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
39. See Richard Sylla, An Historical Primer on the Business of Credit
Ratings, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES, AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
SYSTEM 19, 22-23 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002) (discussing the
expansion of credit ratings agencies as a result of the expansion of the U.S.
bond market); Two Thumbs Down, supra note 1, at 640, 647 (discussing the
financial market crash of 1929 and the Vietnam War's effect on the financial
crisis).
40. Sylla, supra note 39, at 22-23 (discussing the expansion of credit
ratings agencies as a result of the expansion of the U.S. bond market).
[Vol. 8
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"benchmarks" for investors when choosing among several financial
41instruments to invest their money.
As the dependence on the ratings grew among investors-
just one sect of market participants-investment banks, financial
institutions, and corporate issuers became more reliant on them as
well. 42 It could be argued that at this point the ratings became a
"matter of public concern., 43 Their importance and impact spread
across the industry, allowing them to leave a larger footprint on the44
economy. Up until the 1970 bankruptcy of the Penn Central
Transportation Company, which occurred before the imposition of
regulations, a company's credibility and stature in the marketplace
was the driving force behind an investor's choice to invest in that
company. At the time of its bankruptcy, Penn Central
Transportation Company had an enormous amount of debt.45
41. See John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the "Worldwide
Credit Crisis": The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a
Proposal for Improvement, 2009 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 109, 204-05 (2009); see
generally White, supra note 36, at 48 ("The value of the ratings companies for
investors was clear: the ratings provided extra voices of expertise and
assessment for bond investors as to which companies were good credit risks
and which ones were not so good.").
42. See generally Jonathan S. Sack & Stephen M. Juris, Rating Agencies:
Civil Liability Past and Future, 238 N.Y. L.J. 88 (2007), available at
http://www.maglaw.com/publications/data/00144/res/id=saFilel/07011070002
morvillo.pdf ("[in the 1970s ... [t]he [SEC] began subjecting broker-dealers
to minimum capital requirements based on the credit quality of the positions
held in their portfolios .... Consequently, agency ratings became crucial to
underwriters and issuers of securities, and the demand for ratings increased.");
OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 32, at 5-6 (discussing
the historical role of the SEC in the regulation of credit ratings agencies
through no-action letter and Commission releases).
43. See Connick v. Myers. 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983) ("Whether ...
speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the
content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole
record.").
44. See White, supra note 36, at 49 (noting the increase in "issuers'
willingness to pay for the certification of their credit quality that the bond
rating companies provided").
45. See Two Thumbs Down, supra note 1, at 647 (discussing the Penn
Central bankruptcy and its effects on the reputations of rating agencies:
"[linvestors began demanding more sophisticated levels of research . . . [but
the] rating agencies . . . were not in a position to satisfy this demand. ...
When it suddenly became unable to pay those debts, the entire
country panicked; this large, reputable company was no longer a
prominent and stable feature of the economy.4" The use of rating
agencies became more prevalent at this time, and the need for
designation and regulation increased. 47 As a result of this increased
dependence, and as rating agencies naturally needed to provide
dependable and accurate assessments of an issuer's credit
worthiness,48 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
sought to regulate the agencies' process and output. 49 The idea was
Concern about the failure of the rating agencies to generate accurate and
reliable information, especially during a time of crisis, led to public arguments
for regulation of the credit rating industry."); Arthur Pinto, Commercial and
Labor Law: Control and Responsibility of Credit Ratings Agencies in the
United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. SuPP. 341, 347 (2006) ("Prior to the default,
investors in that market usually relied on the reputation and name of the
issuer. In order to calm the market, issuers turned to credit rating agencies to
sell [their] commercial paper using a credit rating."); see also Kenneth C.
Kettering, Securitization and its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial
Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1679 n.416 (2008) (noting
that the Penn Central bankruptcy may have also caused the rating agencies to
change their fee structure, in which the investor pays, to where the issuer
pays); Rhodes, supra note 27, at 308 (same).
46. 3 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES: FROM THE AGE OF DERIVATIVES INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM (1970-
2001) 5 (2002) (noting that before this crisis occurred, "[c]orporations in
America were borrowing large amounts of money ... through the commercial
paper market").
47. See Pinto, supra note 45, at 347 (detailing the Penn Central default as
a trigger of regulation and increased reliance on rating agencies); see also
OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 32, at 5-6 ("Although
the Commission originated the use of the term 'NRSRO' in regulation, ratings
by NRSROs today are widely used as benchmarks in federal and state
legislation ... [and] for distinguishing among grades of creditworthiness in
federal and state legislation.").
48. See Rhodes, supra note 27, at 302 (discussing the growth of the
ratings agencies in the financial world and specifically noting the "importance
of ratings to investors and to the marketplace").
49. See generally OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKET, supra note
32, at 5 (noting that the importance, and "influence," of the ratings has grown
over the years, affecting countries other than the U.S. and "affect[ing]
securities markets in many ways, including an issuer's access to capital, the
structure of transactions, and the ability of fiduciaries and others to make
particular investments"). See also Hunt, supra note 41, at 133 (noting that the
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to create a mechanism by which investors and market participants
could regain confidence in the market through the SEC's outright
endorsement of one agency over another.5'
The SEC implemented its first regulations," coining the
term "nationally recognized statistical ratings organizations"
(NRSRO), which was "designed to ensure that its ratings were
credible and reasonably relied upon by the marketplace" and
applied to any rating agency that met the status requirements.52
Then in 1975, the SEC promulgated Rule 15c3-1,53 which
established "net capital" requirements for broker-dealers, thereby
indirectly instituting formal requirements14 for broker-dealers to
use agencies that were designated NRSROs . The net capital rule
NRSRO designation was granted through the "'no-action letter' process in
which the candidate agency would submit an application to the SEC and wait
to receive a 'no-action letter' indicating that the agency would be treated as an
NRSRO. Apparently the criteria for this determination were unclear and
decisions were often a long time coming.").
50. See RETHINKING REGULATION, supra note 2, at 4-5 (noting that the
designation of NRSRO status led to reliance on the ratings).
51. These regulations came in the form of no-action letters. See THOMAS
LEE HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES: CASES AND MATERIALS 691 (3d ed. 2009) ("No action letters
are SEC staff responses to private requests for indication of whether certain
contemplated conduct is in compliance with the appropriate statutory
provisions and rules. The SEC's no action responses are staff interpretations
rather than formal Commission action and thus have limited precedential
weight.").
52. See OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 32, at 5-6.
The various criteria required in order to be classified as an NRSRO include,
but are not limited to, the "organizational structure of the rating organization"
and "the rating organization's independence from the companies it rates." Id.
at 9-10.
53. Net Capital Requirements for Brokers or Dealers, 17 C.F.R. §
240.15c3-1 (1975).
54. See OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 32, at 6 n.9
(noting that before the formal requirements were put into place, the nationally
recognized securities exchanges used the ratings for "calculating haircuts" and
states used them for "limit[ing] the investment discretion"; however, the state
would only use ratings issued by agencies that were "designated as reliable by
the state").
55. See generally White, supra note 36, at 48-49 ("[O]nly the NRSRO's
ratings would be valid for the determination of the broker-dealers' capital
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
required broker-dealers to "have sufficient liquid assets to satisfy
their current liabilities, particularly the claims of customers, as well
as a 'cushion' to cover certain market and credit risks., 5 6 The SEC
determined that the requirement to use credible and designated
NRSROs to meet the net-capital requirements pursuant to the rule
would allow financial institutions to deduct a lesser amount from
their net worth when calculating their net capital.57 This "haircut"
is designed to "provide a margin of safety against losses that might
be incurred by broker-dealers as a result of market fluctuations in
the prices of, or lack of liquidity in, their proprietary positions."'S"
In effect, the SEC was protecting the market and attempting to
bolster investor protection by regulating ratings it deemed as
accurate and reliable indicators of a security's viability and
strength. 9 The SEC's designation of NRSRO to a particular rating
agency became a rubber stamp that not only endorsed the use of
the rating, but made its use obligatory for a reputable financial
institution. To analogize, a reader is not obliged to eat at the
restaurant profiled in the newspaper. In that context, there is no
need to protect the consumer, lending weight to a newspaper's First
Amendment defense. Unlike newspaper reviews or editorials, the
need to protect the consumer from unregulated ratings (evidenced
by the SEC's regulation) suffices to deny ratings the same First
Amendment protection.
The SEC implemented a rule that would directly affect a
broker-dealer's calculation of its net worth and yet indirectly show
the SEC's "dependence on [the] credit ratings. "6" By doing so, the
requirements"); Kettering, supra note 45, at 1695 ("[The net capital rule]
requires broker-dealers to hold less capital against debt securities they own
that are rated investment grade by an NRSRO than against debt securities not
so rated.").
56. Steven L. Molinari and Nelson S. Kibler, Broker-Dealers' Financial
Responsibility Under the Uniform Net Capital Rule -A Case for Liquidity, 72
GEo. L.J. 1, 2 (1983).
57. OPERATION OFTHE SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 32, at 6.
58. Id.
59. See Rhodes, supra note 27, at 323 ("[A]s the public bond market has
grown, the number of rating agencies commanding national presence has
increased the number of agencies seeking NRSRO status.").
60. RETHINKING REGULATION, supra note 2, at 4 n.3.
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SEC obligated itself to differentiate among agencies by designating
those it considered, based on objective criteria, suitable for use by
broker-dealers. In its analysis, the SEC noted:
The single most important factor in the
Commission staff's assessment of NRSRO
status is whether the rating agency is
"nationally recognized" in the United States as
an issuer of credible and reliable ratings by the
predominant users of securities ratings. The
staff also reviews the operational capability and
• • • 61
reliability of each rating organization.
In determining which rating agency would achieve NRSRO status,
6 2
the SEC examined the rating agency process. Once an assessment
was made, the SEC would issue a "no-action" letter detailing its
approval of the rating agency and allowing the rating agency to be
designated an NRSRO.63 The no-action letter had a particularly
interesting meaning, as it "promised that the Division of Market
Regulation would not recommend enforcement action against any
broker-dealer that used the applicant's ratings for determining its
capital requirements." This approval procedure not only became
a way for the SEC to endorse a particular rating agency, but also
imposed an obligation on the broker-dealer to use a particular
rating agency. The process employed by the SEC in designating
and recognizing NRSROs resulted in the addition of only "four
additional firms as NRSROs" between the years of 1975 and 2000,
"[b]ut mergers among them.., reduced the net number of NRSRO
firms back to the original three-Moody's, S&P, and Fitch-by
61. OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 32, at 9.
62. See Lawrence J. White, The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial
Organization Analysis 1, 11 (Stern Sch. of Bus., N.Y. Univ., Working Paper
EC-01-01, 2001), available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/eco/wkpapers/working
papers0l/01-02White.pdf (noting that when the SEC first formally adopted
and used the term NRSRO, it "'grandfathered' Moody's, S&P, and Fitch").
63. See Rhodes, supra note 27, at 325-26 (discussing the designation of
the NRSRO status by the SEC specifically as it relates to the selection process
employed by the regulatory body, which turns upon whether that rating
agency's ratings were "commonly used" by those in the financial industry,
thereby making the agency "nationally recognized").
64. White, supra note 36, at 50.
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2000. ' '61 With so few reputable NRSROs operating in the market,
financial institutions were bound-even obligated-to use the same
agencies, and investors began to expect issuers to use such
66
agencies.
Although the rating processes vary by rating agency,6' a
holistic view reveals consistency in the industry, specifically in the
role played by the agencies' rating committees.6 Each committee
typically is made up of a lead analyst and senior members of
management who decide on a particular rating by a "majority
vote. 6 ' The committee requests and analyzes a number of public
and private documents, including, but not limited to, the issuer's
financial statements and general benchmark data.7' Once all
information is gathered and reviewed, the members of the
committee deliberate and provide their recommendation to the
issuer/client." The issuer is then allowed to negotiate with the
rating agency and alter the press releases concerning the upcoming
ratings decision prior to the releases' publication; however, exercise
65. Id. See, e.g., Letter from Sean J. Egan & W. Bruce Jones, Egan-Jones
Ratings Co. to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, United States Securities and
Exchange Commission (Nov. 10, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
extra/credrate/eganjones2.htm [hereinafter Egan-Jones Letter] (stating that
the predominantly used ratings agencies for SlVs are S&P and Moody's and
that they maintain a "partner monopoly" in which "the two firms share the
market whereby the gain in revenues by one firm does not reduce the
revenues of the second firm. Since two ratings are normally needed for the
issuance of bonds, the gains of Moody's do not come at the expense of S&P
and vice versa.").
66. See RETHINKING REGULATION, supra note 2, at 5 ("Without high
ratings, bond issuers cannot access certain markets because they do not have a
'license' from the NRSROs to comply with NRSRO-dependent regulations.").
67. See David W. Forti & Blase B. laconelli, Commercial Mortgage-
Backed Securities and the Rating Agency Process, in SECURITIZATIONS:
LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES §§ 19.01, 19.03 (Patrick D. Dolan & C.
VanLeer Davis I II eds., 2001), available at http://www.dechert.com/library/
Commercial %20Mortgage%20Backed%20Securities-Forti %20D%205-
02.PDF (discussing the general rating process employed in "commercial
mortgage-backed securities").
68. OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 32, at 25.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 25-26.
71. Id. at 26.
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of this right must be supported by credible and substantial
information, and "the right of appeal is limited both in time and to
the submission of new and important information.""
In a clear effort to curb the number of actual conflicts or
appearance of conflicts, Congress adopted the Credit Rating
Agency Reform Act of 2006."3 In large part, the Act was an
attempt to develop "transparency," increase disclosure regarding
potential "conflicts of interest," and provide a structured
mechanism for rating agencies to attain NRSRO status.74 However,
the Act is insufficient; although any known conflicts of interest
must be disclosed pursuant to the Act, it lacks a mechanism or
procedure by which to eliminate or mitigate such disclosed conflicts
since it allows the agency to obtain "fees from either issuers,
investors, or other market participants, or a combination thereof.,
75
Allowing the issuers to compensate the rating agency is an
endorsement of the "issuer-pay model" that is in conflict with the
"challenge [faced by] credit raters of impartially rating securities of
companies that generate their revenues., 76  Of particular
importance is the section entitled "Accountability for Ratings
Procedures," which states that the Act will be "narrowly tailored"
and that "neither the Commission nor any State . . . may regulate
the substance of credit ratings or the procedures and methodologies
72. Id.
73. Pub. L. No. 109-291, § 2, 120 Stat. 1327, 1327 (2006) (stating that the
purpose of the Act is "[t]o improve ratings quality for the protection of
investors and in the public interest by fostering accountability, transparency,
and competition in the credit rating agency industry."). See also Kettering,
supra note 45, at 1674 (noting that the Enron debacle was an "impetus" to the
need for increased regulatory oversight); Hunt, supra note 41, at 125 (noting
that a report issued after SEC hearings, which were held specifically to discuss
the rating agencies, identified numerous "questions" about the agencies and
subsequently the Reform Act was adopted allowing the SEC to promulgate
laws affecting the rating agencies).
74. § 6, 120 Stat. at 1338. See also Stuart Kaswell et al., Credit Agency
Reform Act Signed into Law, DECHERT ON POINT, Dec. 2006, 1, 1,
http://www.dechert.com/library/fs-update16-12-06.pdf (discussing the purpose
and intended effects of adopting the Credit Agency Reform Act of 2006).
75. § 3, 120 Stat. at 1328.
76. RETHINKING REGULATION, supra note 2, at 4.
by which [the rating agency] determines credit ratings." 77 Yet the
Act does not include any substantive terms to mitigate potential
conflicts that may become prevalent in the rating process.
Historically, the popularity of rating agencies was as much a
function of market shifts as institutional demand."' Regulatory
oversight followed this demand as various financial crises emerged
and as financial markets and investors became more sophisticated. 79
The importance of ratings to individuals and institutional investors
would lead to the presumption that the more independent the
analysis conducted by a rating agency, the more reliable its
ratings. Yet because of their monopolistic nature,"' historical
background, 2  and realigned fee structures"' (all of which
underscore the level of accuracy and unconstrained review required
77. § 15E(c), 120 Stat. at 1332. See generally White, supra note 36, at 52
(discussing the role of ratings agencies and the impact of the Credit Reform
Act on the reality of how ratings agencies operate).
78. See Frank Partnoy, Historical Perspectives on the Financial Crisis:
Ivar Kreuger, The Credit-Ratings Agencies, and Two Theories About the
Function, and Dysfunction, of Markets, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 431, 441 (2009)
[hereinafter Historical Perspectives] ("Over time, as the reliance on ratings
took hold, ratings became part of investing culture .... As private reliance on
ratings grew, private actors focused more on letter ratings than on the
underlying credit analysis, such as the expected probability of default.").
79. See Sylla, supra note 39, at 20-24 (discussing the evolving roles of the
rating agencies and the effects of national and global economic events on the
ratings processes and reputation): see also Kettering, supra note 45, at 1674
("[T]he dominant rating agencies continued to rate the ordinary debt of Enron
Corporation as investment grade until four days before Enron filed for
bankruptcy. Enron's failure was the impetus for a tidal wave of legislative and
administrative activity .... ").
80. See Rhodes, supra note 27, at 317 ("[Ain agency's rating is valuable
only so long as it is an independent and reliable assessment of the issuer.").
81. See Egan-Jones Credit Rating Co., Am. Enterprise Inst. Presentation:
"How to Improve the Credit Rating Agency Sector" (June 24, 2008),
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20080624_EganPresentation.pdf ("According to
Moody's itself, these three companies [Moody's, S&P, and Fitch] are
responsible for 95% of global ratings with shares of 39%, 40%, and 16%
respectively.").
82. See Rhodes, supra note 27, at 300-302 (briefly discussing the role and
growth of rating agencies).
83. See id. at 308 ("Most rating agencies presently charge the issuer a fee
for the rating service.").
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in the rating assessments), the claim that the ratings are or should
be protected as mere opinions or editorials is incorrect; it simply
disregards the very nature of these ratings and their control over
the financial markets. 4
III. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF
RATINGS IN LIGHT OF ABU DHABI
Individual investors and issuers have targeted rating
agencies as major contributors to the recent financial crisis,
claiming that the rating agencies categorized the risk of the
products inaccurately when they assigned the products' ratings and
challenging the presumption that the ratings process is adequate.8'
In lawsuits against rating agencies, plaintiffs have alleged
defamation,6 negligent misrepresentation"7 and libel." Throughout
these cases, the rating agencies have continued to argue that their
ratings are equivalent to editorials or opinions written by
84. See Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley, 651 F. Supp. 2d
155, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("[T]he market at large, including sophisticated
investors, [has] come to rely on the accuracy of credit ratings and the
independence of rating agencies because of their NRSRO status .... ").
85. See Darcy, supra note 26, at 613 (discussing the credit crisis and the
role played by the credit rating agencies in "subprime mortgage origination"
and "the securities that those mortgages were later packaged into .... "); John
Crawford, Hitting the Sweet Spot by Accident: How Recent Lower Court Cases
Help Realign Incentives in the Credit Rating Industry, 42 CONNTEMPLATIONS
13, 16 (2009), http://connecticutlawreview.org/documents/CrawfordFinal.pdf
(discussing the "reliance" on "highly flawed ratings" as a contributing factor in
the real estate meltdown).
86. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985).
87. Abu Dhabi, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 168; LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Duff &
Phelps Credit Rating Co., 951 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
88. See Husisian, supra note 24, at 447 (discussing the various defamation
and negligent misrepresentation claims brought against ratings agencies);
Crawford, supra note 85, at 19 (noting the various claims brought by rating
agencies).
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newspaper journalists, and must be afforded First Amendment
protection.89
In Abu Dhabi, the court demonstrates a reluctance to afford
ratings First Amendment protection by highlighting various factors
embedded in the rating agency process that clearly differentiate an
editorial from a rating.9" Surprisingly, though, some courts in the
past were more than inclined to grant rating agencies First
Amendment protection; some courts reasoned that the ratings are
indeed opinions (and thus protected under the First Amendment) 9 1
while others reasoned that even if they cannot be classified as
opinions, they are not assertions that can be construed as factual.92
89. The category of speech most applicable to the rating agencies is not
opinion, but commercial speech, which garners less First Amendment
protection. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 563 (1980). In Central Hudson, the Court defined commercial
speech as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
and its audience." Id. at 561. The Court further identified the four prong test
that became the framework for determining the bounds of government
regulation of commercial speech: first, determine if the "speech ... concern[s]
lawful activity and [is not] misleading"; second, ask whether the government's
interest in protecting the speech at issue is "substantial." Affirmative answers
to both questions lead to the last parts of the test: third, determine whether
the "regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted"; and
fourth, "whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest." Id. at 566. Subjecting rating agencies' arguments for First
Amendment protection to this analysis would demonstrate that government's
interest in regulating such speech-protecting the public-is substantial and
any regulations proposed would directly advance that interest.
90. See Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley, 651 F. Supp. 2d
155, 175-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
91. Cf., e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990)
(noting that there is no need to have a separate provision to encompass
"'opinions' [in the First Amendment] ... to ensure the freedom of expression
guaranteed by the First Amendment").
92. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. v. Moody's Investor's Servs., Inc., 175
F.3d 848, 856 (10th Cir. 1999).
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A. The Road to Abu Dhabi
In 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,93 addressed the limitations of First
Amendment protection in defamation actions. 94  The opinion
examined matters that are of interest to the general public, an issue
that directly correlates to the First Amendment defense held by
rating agencies. 95 The Court addressed the issue of whether a false
credit report was an issue of public concern, holding that the
requirement that the plaintiff show "actual malice, 9 6 (proof of
known falsity) for defamation does not apply in a case in which the
matter is of "private concern. ''9 7 The Court referenced the limited
93. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
94. Id. at 749. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. ("Greenmoss") brought a
defamation action against the credit reporting agency, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,
for issuing a false report to its subscribers that Greenmoss was in bankruptcy.
Although Dun & Bradstreet is not a credit rating agency, but a credit
reporting agency, the importance of this case rests with the dissemination of
the material at issue and the Court's classification of what constitutes "matters
of public concern." Id. See also Crawford, supra note 85, at 20 (noting that
Dun & Bradstreet "is essential to [the holding] in Abu Dhabi Commercial
Bank").
95. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 758-59 ("[T]he Court has frequently
reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the 'highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values,' and is entitled to special protection.")
(citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982): Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
96. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). In
Sullivan, the Court noted the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the
defendant had 'actual malice' prior to issuing the article; i.e., that the
defendant knew the material was false or had reckless disregard for whether it
was false or not." Id. The publication (a paid advertisement) was not
considered 'commercial' advertising but instead "expressed opinion, recited
grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on . . .
matters of the highest public interest and concern." Id. at 266. See also
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (defining actual malice as having
a "high degree of awareness of their probable falsity").
97. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 758-59 ("[N]ot all speech is of equal
First Amendment importance. It is speech on 'matters of public concern' that
is 'at the heart of the First Amendment's protection."' (quoting First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)). The Court noted further
that the "petitioner's credit report concerns no public issue. It was speech
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number of people to whom the credit report was disseminated as
justification that the report was not a matter of public importance
and thus not "at the heart of First Amendment's protection."' 9"
Further, the Court differentiated credit reporting agencies from
other firms that should be protected under the First Amendment,
noting that reporting agencies which "are in the business of selling
financial information to ... subscribers who have paid substantial
fees for their services .. .[are not] the type[s] of media worthy of
the First Amendment protection as contemplated by New York
[Times Co. v. Sullivan]."99 This apparent conflict of interest was
crucial for the Dun & Bradstreet Court, both in determining
whether First Amendment protection encompasses the rating
agencies' activities and in differentiating media entities from credit
reporting agencies.
The determinations of whether a rating is a matter of public
concern and of whether rating agencies are comparable to
journalists both depend on the distinction between fact and
opinion. In the 1990 case Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,"" the
Court addressed this distinction, holding that the First Amendment
did not need a separate provision to encompass "opinions" and that
labeling a statement as an opinion does not grant the author of the
statement full constitutional protection."" To prevail in a
defamation action, the Court indicated, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that (a) the statement can be proven false and (b) the
statement can be construed as a factual assertion of the facts and
circumstances."" Although the test for defamation requires that
solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its specific business
audience." Id. at 762.
98. Id. at 759. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1053 (2006) (discussing the reintroduction of
the "matters of public concern" concept first discounted in Gertz.).
99. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 753 (citing Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254);
see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 98, at 1054 ("[N]onmedia individuals and
entities also can play an important role in informing the public").
100. 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (an action against a journalist for publishing an
article accusing the plaintiff of lying under oath at an Ohio High School
Athletic Association hearing).
101. Id. at 21.
102. Id. at 2.
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the statements be proven false, this test is misplaced in the rating
agencies context because the ratings assigned are predictions about
future issuances, and intuitively one cannot prove in the present
that a prediction of future events is false.
In 1999, the Tenth Circuit relied on Milkovich to address
the fact/opinion distinction in response to Moody's asserted defense
that its ratings were mere opinions and not statements of factual
information. The plaintiff in Jefferson County School District v.
Moody's Investor's Services, Inc. "" had sued Moody's for
defamation, alleging that Moody's voluntary and negative rating of
the school district's bonds caused a ripple effect in which "purchase
orders ceased, [and] several buyers canceled prior orders . . .
thereby causing it to suffer a net loss of $769,000.""4 Moody's
claimed that its ratings were not assertions of factual information,
but opinions that qualified as protected speech.'1 5 The court turned
to the well-established holding in Milkovich: first, "a statement of
opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not
contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full
constitutional protection";1 6  and second, "against media
defendants, the First Amendment requires that a plaintiff bear the
burden of proving that the statement in question was false and that
the defendant had the requisite state of mind."'' 7  Most
importantly, the court noted a distinction first made by Professor
Sowle in the aftermath of Milkovich between "evaluative opinions,"
which cannot be "prov[en] false and thus attach no liability to the
opinion's author," and "deductive opinions," which "state or imply
assertions that may be proven false" and therefore warrant
liability. '"s The reference to Professor Sowle's distinction was a
103. 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999).
104. Id. at 851.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 852 (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20
(1990)).
107. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 175 F.3d at 852. (citing Milkovich, 497
U.S. at 14).
108. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 175 F.3d at 853 (quoting Kathryn Dix
Sowle, A Matter of Opinion: Milkovich Four Years Later, 3 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 467, 474 (1994)).
reiteration of the court's holding that the opinion must assert a fact
that is "provably false," i.e. deductive. "9
With its application of the Milkovich standard, the Jefferson
court held that the ratings were indeed protected under the First
Amendment, but noted that merely because Moody's labeled its
ratings as opinions did not mean that the rating agency should be
"shielded from liability," especially if the "opinion[s] were shown to
have materially false components.'' "  Despite its ultimate ruling,
the Jefferson court's statements in reference to Milkovich reveal
that the court was becoming less lenient toward the "opinion"
defense commonly put forth by rating agencies. The court's
assertion that merely labeling something an 'opinion' does not grant
it outright acceptance as an opinion for purposes of First
Amendment protection is evidence of the court's strict analysis."'1
It was not until 2003 that rating agencies failed to
demonstrate in court that their ratings were independently-
gathered predictors of the future and not factual assertions, thus
precluding them from claiming the same protections granted to
journalists. 2 Fitch, Inc. v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc. involved a
subpoena request that a UBS PaineWebber (UBS) client submitted
to Fitch in its litigation against UBS. 13 UBS paid two rating
agency firms, Moody's and Fitch, to issue ratings on a number of
securities it pooled together for one of its clients. 114 Pursuant to
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) regulations, the securities
needed to be "investment grade.""' 5 When the OTS discovered that
the securities did not meet these requirements, the client tried and
failed to return the securities to UBS. 1 6 During discovery, the
client learned that Fitch had been involved in structuring the
products; specifically, Fitch had recommended "changes to the
deal's structure [that] would be required to achieve the desired
109. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 175 F.3d at 853.
110. Id. at 856.
111. Id.
112. Fitch, Inc. v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc., 330 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2003).
113. Id. at 106.
114. Id. at 107.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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rating.""' 7 The subpoena sparked First Amendment concerns, and
the rating agency, refusing to supply the information, called itself a
"professional journalist"' ' under the New York Shield Law, which
defines a professional journalist as:
one who, for gain or livelihood, is engaged in
gathering, preparing, collecting, writing,
editing, filming, taping or photographing of
news intended for a newspaper, magazine, news
agency, . ..or other professional medium or
agency which has as one of its regular functions
the processing and researching of news
intended for dissemination to the public. 
9
The court held, however, that Fitch did not establish that
"the information it sought to protect was gathered pursuant to the
newsgathering activities of a professional journalist.""'2 " The court
based its holding on the rating agency's two conflicts of interests:
(1) Fitch does not issue ratings on securities for which it is not
compensated;.' and (2) Fitch was intimately involved in the
"planning of the transactions." 22
The Fitch court was reluctant to automatically accept the
agency's denomination of its ratings as opinions, deciding instead to
review the totality of circumstances comprising the relationship
between the issuer of the securities and the rating agency. The
court recognized the conflicts entrenched in this relationship as
two-fold: 1) the level of interaction between the rating agency and
the issuer of the securities in the structuring of the product; and 2)
the fact that the rating agency is being paid to rate the securities. 123
The presence of these conflicts suggests that the process lacked
independence based on the role of the rating agency. Analogizing,
the Fitch court noted that "[u]nlike a business newspaper or
117. Id.
118. Id. at 109.
119. Id. (quoting N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(a)(6)).
120. Id. at 111 ("Whether Fitch, or one of its rivals, could ever be entitled
to assert the newsgathering privilege is a question we leave for another day.").
121. Id. at 109-10.
122. Id. at 110-11.
123. Id. at 111.
magazine, which would cover any transactions deemed newsworthy,
Fitch only 'covers' its own clients. We believe this practice weighs
against treating Fitch like a journalist."' 2 4 The agency's level of
involvement created a conflict of interest warranting the court's
holding that such a biased interaction was not protected by the First
Amendment.
Fitch's ratings were denied First Amendment protection
again in 2004. In Commercial Financial Services, Inc. v. Standard &
Poor's,125 the court reasoned that the compensation received for the
ratings adversely affected the rating agency's duty to the company
(its client) and its investors. 126 Commercial Financial Services, Inc.
collected bad debts and placed them in a pooled fund, which was
then sold to a trust that, in turn, sold to investors securities that
were "secured by" these "pooled bad debts." 27 The rating agencies
were responsible for rating the securities issued by the trust., 2" The
securities received top-notch investment grade ratings, indicating
that the corporation was credit-worthy, when in fact it was not. 
29
In denying First Amendment protection to the rating agencies
based on their compensation for the ratings, the court drew a
comparison to a journalist "hired . . . to write a company report,"
who would not be covered under the First Amendment. 3" The
court was clear in noting that the relationship between the paying
124. Id. at 109. See also David J. Grais & Kostas D. Katsiris, Not "The
World's Shortest Editorial": Why the First Amendment Does Not Shield the
Ratings Agencies from Liability for Over-Rating CDOs, BLOOMBERG L. REP.,
Nov. 2007, at 1,3, available at http://www.graisellsworth.com/Rating__
Agencies.pdf ("[R]eliable information suggests that [ratings agencies] often
commented (or did until recently) on how a security could be structured to
achieve a desired rating .... ).
125. 94 P.3d 106 (Okla. 2004). Fitch was one of several named
defendants in the case.
126. Id. at I1-t11.
127. Id. at 108.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 110.
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issuer and the rating agency is unequivocally different from that
between the journalist and the newspaper.131
In Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Investor Services, 32 a 2007
case, Compuware brought a defamation claim against Moody's
after the rating agency downgraded Compuware to one of its
poorest creditworthiness ratings.133 In exchange for its ratings,
Moody's fees amounted to a $25,000 initiation fee and a $200,000
ongoing fee. 134  During its ongoing monitoring of Compuware,
"Moody's published a statement indicating that Compuware's
credit rating was under review for a 'possible downgrade.",1
35
Amid fears that it would be issued a downgrade and suffer adverse
consequences, Compuware reduced its credit loan by $400
million. 36 Once the ratings statement was issued, and putting aside
the fact that Compuware presented a viable balance sheet, the
ratings report reflected negatively on the corporation's financial
future. 137 The Compuware court noted that Moody's provides a
mere prediction about the financial future and does not
communicate a "provably false factual connotation . . . [and] such
inferences could not be proven false because of the inherently
subjective nature of Moody's ratings calculation."' ' 38
Overall, claims against rating agencies have imposed on
courts an obligation to test the boundaries of the Constitution
through an analysis of the rating agencies' defense of First
Amendment protection. Although precedent, such as Abu Dhabi,
has identified the conflicts of interest embedded in the rating
agency process, such as the fee structure and operational
131. Id. (noting that the relationship between the paying issuer and the
rating agency "is more analogous to that of a client and the client's certified
public accountant").
132. 499 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2007).
133. Id. at 523.
134. Id. at 522-23.
135. Id. at 523.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 524 (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20
(1990)).
138. Id. at 529 (citation omitted). In arriving at its conclusion, the court
applied the actual malice standard from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
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involvement, the tests that a rating must be "provably false" and a
"matter of public concern" create too high a standard and provide
too narrow an interpretation, respectively.
B. Abu Dhabi
The Abu Dhabi court held that the rating agencies could not
claim First Amendment protection for the high ratings they
assigned to private placement securities, which were primarily
invested in residential mortgage-backed securities. "39
Although it restricted its holding to these particular types of
financial instruments, the court further solidified the "matter of
public concern" test applied to determine First Amendment
protection. It also implicitly recognized that the ratings process
may not be entirely objective.14 1 Crucial factors for the court
included the size of the audience to which the rating is targeted, the
fee payouts, and the rating agencies' level of active participation in
the structuring of the securities being rated. 42 Of these factors, two
are related to potential conflicts of interest: the rating agencies'
compensation arrangement and level of involvement. The court
alluded to the subjective nature of the ratings process as a result of a
confluence of these conflicts of interest and wholly disregarded
whether subjectivity was intentional on the part of the rating
agencies.
It is the existence of these conflicts that surrounds the
debate about denying First Amendment protection to rating
agencies. However, the rating agencies' financial interest in each
139. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley, 651 F. Supp. 2d
155, 175-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
140. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983) (discussing the test
for determining whether speech is a matter of public concern).
141. Abu Dhabi, 651 F. Supp. 2d 155.
142. An additional conflict is the obligation of investors, pursuant to
statute, to purchase certain investment grade securities. See RETHINKING
REGULATION, supra note 2, at 4 ("Regulators now mandate that institutions of
all types pay heed to NRSRO credit ratings as a necessary step for regulatory
compliance. Some rules require that certain investors can only buy bonds with
high ratings.").
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rating transaction precludes an assessment of whether the First
Amendment applies, as the public policy interest in protecting
investors and restoring market confidence far outweighs the
interests of the rating agencies in sustaining market power.
1. Is a rating a "matter of public concern"?
Although the Abu Dhabi court was justified in denying the
rating agencies' First Amendment protection, its focus on whether
the financial instrument was a matter of public concern is too
restrictive a test to apply for two reasons. First, this test does not
allow for a holistic assessment of the effects all ratings have on
those who are not direct purchasers of the rated products.
4 3
Second, if the courts are willing to deny First Amendment
protection merely because a few investors were harmed, they
should be more inclined to regulate ratings that harm the general
public. As a result of the change in the rating business model,
where the issuer now pays for the rating, 144 the transaction between
the issuer and the rating agency in rating any financial instrument
now has a negative effect on the public because the interaction
between the parties is constrained by mutual pecuniary interests.
The fundamental fee structure of the private contract has not
changed just because the target audience of the securities is
different.
The rating agencies have claimed that their ratings are
matters of public concern and thus should be protected by the First
143. See Darcy, supra note 26, at 620-21 (discussing the downgraded
securities' effect on the real estate crisis); see also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S.
75, 86 (1966) ("Society has a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and
redressing attacks upon reputation .... The thrust of New York Times [Co. v.
Sullivan] is that when interests in public discussion are particularly strong ...
the Constitution limits the protections afforded by the law of defamation.");
Husisian, supra note 24, at 456 ("To ensure the free ordering of private affairs
based on efficient information disclosure, we traditionally regulate
publications only where there are significant third party effects.").
144. See Kettering, supra note 45, at 1687 (discussing the inherent
conflict created by the issuer pays model).
Amendment. 45  In response, courts have analyzed the target
audience of the ratings, specifically examining the number of
investors to whom the rating is disseminated.' 46 In Abu Dhabi, for
example, the court denied a claim for First Amendment protection
because the securities were private placement issuances (only
marketable to distinct eligible investors and not to "the public at
large")' 47 and therefore were not "matters of public concern"
worthy of First Amendment protection.148 Like the court in Abu
Dhabi, the court in Dun & Bradstreet concluded that the credit
report was not a matter of public concern and did not "involve[]
145. See David Segal, A Matter of Opinion?, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2009, at
BU6 (discussing Floyd Abrams's argument on behalf of S&P: "The major
similarity here is that both the newspaper and S.&P. are offering opinions on
matters that people can and do disagree about.").
146. See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 810 (S.D. Tex.
2005) (discussing the various cases in which courts have looked primarily to
the number of investors directly affected by the rating agency's dissemination
as support for the claim that the rating agency is discussing a matter of public
importance).
147. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley, 651 F. Supp. 2d
155, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). See also In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., 580 F.
Supp. 2d 630, 640 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (refusing to grant First Amendment
protection to materials that were disseminated to distinct "institutional
investors").
148. Abu Dhabi, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 175. See also Dun & Bradstreet v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) ("[whether] ... speech
addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by [the expression's]
content, form, and context ... as revealed by the whole record."(citations
omitted)); Approaches to Improving Credit Rating Agency Regulation:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and
Government Sponsored Enterprises, 111th Cong. 33 (2009) (statement of
Eugene Volokh, Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law)
available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcsdem/
volokh.pdf at 1, 5 [hereinafter Volokh statement] ("[L]ower courts have made
clear that 'the relevant concern need not be of paramount importance or
national scope' to qualify." (quoting Levinksy's, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
127 F.3d 122, 132 (1st Cir. 1997))). Professor Volokh states that it is
unnecessary to determine whether the rating agency is a member of the press
since the "broad" interpretation of First Amendment Law protects speech
without having to delve into the definition of "media." Id. Volokh further
notes that "[c]redit rating agencies are speakers, and their evaluations,
opinions, and factual assertions are speech." Id.
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any 'strong interest in the free flow of commercial information"'
because it was only available to five individuals and was of
''individual interest [to] the speaker and its specific business
audience ... who, under the terms of the subscription agreement,
could not disseminate it further." 1
49
The courts' adherence to this target-audience test is evident
in LaSalle National Bank. v. Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Co.,
15
,
where the court held that the rating at issue, assigned to a product
disseminated via private placement, was not protected under the
First Amendment because it was not of general interest to the
public.' 5' The court went further, however, and explicitly
recognized the conflicts of interest that were embedded in the
rating process by analogizing to the court's holding in In re Taxable
Bond Securities Litigation. 152 In that case, the court noted that since
the rating agency (S&P) was hired for its services and aware that
the ratings it issued would be distributed via private placement
memoranda, its membership in the "financial media" would neither
protect it under the First Amendment nor prevent it from being
subject to "generally applicable laws" such as those relating to
insider trading.153 To conclude, that Court noted that "S & P stands
in no better position from the perspective of First Amendment
defenses than any other participant in the bond transactions."'
54
149. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761-62 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy
Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976))
(additional citation omitted). Extending the argument that a rating is a matter
of public concern, precedent requires that in order for a plaintiff to prevail in
its claim that a rating agency should not be afforded FA protection, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the agency acted with "actual malice." This
analysis is unnecessary, though, since the confluence of the conflicts of interest
should preclude application of the test.
150. 951 F.Supp.1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
151. Id. at 1096.
152. Id. See also In re Taxable Mun. Bond Sec. Litig., 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18592 (E.D. La. 1993).
153. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 951 F. Supp. at 1096 (quoting In re Taxable
Mun. Bond. Sec. Litig., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592, at 14); see also Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.R.F. § 240, Rules 10b, 10b-5 (2009).
154. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 951 F. Supp. at 1096 (quoting In re Taxable
Mun. Bond Sec. Litig., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592, at 14) (emphasis added).
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Since the inception of the ratings business, the types of
financial instruments rated progressed from the railroad bonds in
the 1900s to numerous complex structured products. As a result, the
ratings assigned no longer affect only the direct purchasers of the
products rated, but instead affect all those who have an interest in
the financial sector. 5 5 This occurs in any transaction between the
issuer and the rating agency where their private contract, clouded
with motivation (by both parties) for financial benefit, invites the
presumption that the rating is not an accurate, independent
assessment of the underlying risk and thereby can have detrimental
effects in the marketplace.
5 6
These effects can best be seen in the current credit crisis. 15,
One author's depiction of this effect on the current credit crisis
supports the argument that regardless of the number of investors
solicited to purchase the top rated bonds and other instruments, the
negative impact of these failing instruments reverberates across the
world:
A welter of regulator reports on the crisis
asserts that high credit ratings on novel
financial instruments helped induce investors to
purchase these instruments. When the
instruments started to appear much riskier than
traditional investments carrying similar ratings,
investors lost confidence in the ratings . .
triggering adverse consequences for the global
financial system."5"
The effects of ratings are not only linked to the product
rated but are extended to the rating agencies' counterparts in the
global financial markets. The relationship between monoline
155. See RETHINKING REGULATION, supra note 2, at 4 (discussing the
role credit rating agencies played in the aftermath of 1929 economic crash).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 148-51.
157. See Crawford, supra note 85, at 15 ("[O]verly excessive ratings
contributed to excessive liquidity .... This helped feed the real estate bubble.
When the bubble burst, the breakdown in investor confidence in ratings
helped the crisis spread to the broader financial system."); RETHINKING
REGULATION, supra note 2, at 4 (same).
158. Hunt, supra note 41, at 112-13 (emphasis added).
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insurers and rating agencies broadens the impact of rating agencies
and exposes the crux of the conflicts of interests cultivated by the
institutional commingling that has saturated the global financial
industry. 5 9 Monoline insurers provide credit insurance to issuers of
securities to protect against the possible default of the issuer."
The monoline insurers are rated by the same rating agencies that
rate financial products-the very products that are issued by
institutions that obtain monoline insurance. 16' Thus the conflict of
interest is further solidified: the rating agency has an incentive to
issue higher ratings for both the issuer and the monoline insurer
since it is being compensated by both. A corporate issuer of
financial products presumably is more likely to select a monoline
insurer with a higher credit rating than one with a lower credit
rating, all the while aware that the same rating agency selected to
rate its own product may have rated the monoline insurer. Further,
the corporate issuer is inclined to select a monoline insurer that has
a higher rating since that will make its own product more
marketable. Note that the effect is the same, even in the
circumstance where a different rating agency (from one that rated
the issuer) rated the monoline insurer, since the virtual monopoly
held by the three top rating agencies and their standard fee
159. See JAMES P. MCNICHOLS, MONOLINE INSURANCE & FINANCIAL
GUARANTY RESERVING, CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SOCIETY CASUALTY Loss
RESERVE SEMINAR 231,234 (2003), http://www.casact.org/pubs/forum/
03fforum/03ff231.pdf ("[Monoline] insurance provides investors with
guaranteed payment of timely interest and ultimate principal in the event that
a debt issuer is unable to meet its financial obligations.").
160. See COMMITTEE ON THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, BANK FOR
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, THE ROLE OF RATINGS IN STRUCTURED
FINANCE: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS 1, 27 (2005), http://www.bis.org/publ/
cgfs23.pdf?noframes=l [hereinafter ROLE OF RATINGS] (discussing the role of
monoline insurers in the ratings process).
161. See generally Amadou N.R. Sy, The Systemic Regulation of Credit
Rating Agencies and Rated Markets 1-33, 13-14 (IMF Institute, Working Paper
No. 09, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/
wp09129.pdf (discussing the rating agencies' rating of the monoline insurers
and a corresponding contribution to the "systematic risk" posed by those
ratings).
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
structure allow for very little differentiation among these three
agencies. 1
62
It is foreseeable that a rating agency could assign a higher
rating (while under the pressure of financial gain) to both the issuer
and the monoline insurer. This would increase the risk of systemic
default, since investors rely on ratings to choose the issuer and the
issuer relies on ratings to choose its monoline insurer. 163  "[The]
potential conflict of interest arises when the ratings . . are
contingent on the agency's own rating of a monoline insurer that
provides credit enhancement to ... these structures."'' 4 In fact, the
relationship between the rating agencies and the monoline insurers
had severe consequences, being instrumental in the origins of the
current financial crisis: "the rating agencies relied much too
confidently on credit enhancement provided by monoline insurers
[and] the size of the obligations underwritten by these
monolines... have today made them effectively insolvent."'65
162. See Hunt, supra note 41, at 132 ("[S]ome have described the credit-
rating market as effectively a 'partner monopoly' shared by Moody's and
S&P.").
163. See McNICHOLS, supra note 159, at 235 ("The most important
strengths of the primary monoline insurers are their ratings.").
164. ROLE OF RATINGS, supra note 160, at 27-28 ("In some structured
credits, the monoline's AAA or AA rating will be integral to or constitutive of
the rating of highly rated liability tranches.").
165. Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: The Role of the Credit Rating
Agencies, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs 4 (2008) (testimony of Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolph A. Berle
Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School) [hereinafter Coffee
testimony], available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuse
Action=Files.View&FileStoreid=94ccc2ab-8401-4e4c-al b2-7 1 f36a9fd25b.
See also, e.g., Robin J. Powers, Monoline Insurers: Confusion and Chaos in the
Credit Default Swap Market, DERIVATIVES, Jan. 2008, 1, 1, available at
http://www.sutherland.com/files/Publication/f6344cc2-beec-48d4-9b4f-
203028829b35/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e1863c80-321 b-46de-92fe-
22dbaa94ef2f/TDVN-POWERS%252008-03-03.pdf (noting that the effects of
downgrading a monoline insurer can be catastrophic to all parties involved,
regardless of the type of instrument: "Ambac [lost its] AAA rating and has...
recorded potential losses of $1 billion. The rating agencies [review] the entire
group of insurers ... reflecting the [market's] concern that the insurers do not
have enough capital to stem losses flowing from downgrades of the securities
they guaranteed.").
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Consider First Amendment attorney Floyd Abrams's
argument in defense of the rating agencies in Abu Dhabi: "[I]t
shouldn't change the legal dynamics that rating agencies are more
important, or play a greater role, or are looked to by this or that
element of the marketplace." '6 But the problem is not merely that
the rating agencies participate in the market to a greater degree;
rather, it is the depth of their involvement in the marketplace and
the massive level of impact their categorization of risk has on the
public at large.16 7 If rating agencies have become the ticket to entry
into the market and are the "keys" to success for all market
participants, the target-audience test is too simplistic and prosaic a
benchmark to apply.16 1 In fact, the test is inapplicable to the
analysis since the rating process is inherently flawed by conflicts of
interest that impose barriers to the objectivity of a rating. These
barriers should preclude the target-audience test from applying
because the compensation between the rating agency and the issuer
is still the same: an issuer seeks and pays for a rating that will
benefit that issuer. In essence, the ratings are tarnished by the
conflicts of interest existing when they are produced, and this
tarnishing of information should defeat a First Amendment
defense, regardless of who comprises the audience that uses the
ratings.
A possible alternative approach to the "matter of public
concern" test in determining whether rating agencies should be
afforded First Amendment protection is to extend this global
effects inquiry in a manner that promotes what should be the
primary focus of courts and legislatures: protection of the public. In
fact, the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) performs this
166. Segal, supra note 145.
167. See ROLE OF RATINGS, supra note 160, at 29 ("[The] Working
Group cannot rule out the possibility of distressed [downgraded] monolines
helping to propagate and thus exacerbating the severity of low-probability
systemic events.").
168. See RETHINKING REGULATION, supra note 2, at 3-4 ("Over time...
rating agencies have shifted from selling information to selling 'regulatory
licenses,' keys that unlock the financial markets . . . [and as] financial
gatekeepers with little incentive to 'get it right,' credit rating agencies pose a
systemic risk.").
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function -it regulates public offerings of securities by mandating,
among other things, that specific content be inserted into the
securities' "registration statements and prospectuses." 69 The
Securities Act was established during the New Deal era in response
to the negative economic impact of the Great Depression.""
President Roosevelt's justification for the Securities Act was "to
[add to] the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine 'let
the seller beware.' It puts the burden of telling the whole truth on
the seller."''
The focus of the Securities Act is "the disclosure of
information for the purpose of 'letting in the light' to reveal the
facts of issuers' affairs and their overall business health."'72
Requiring the issuer to disclose information on public issuances
through registration statements and prospectuses is a way to
provide this enhanced protection to investors through transparency
of the issuer's business. Registration statements must include, at a
minimum, "[flees promised to developers and/or promoters," "[a]
detailed statement of capitalization," and "[c]opies of legal opinions
on matters related to the issue."' 173 The Securities Act has been
deemed constitutional 174 even though it regulates financial
169. See HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 51, at 602 (describing the
Securities Act of 1933 as one of the main federal securities laws and the law
that governs "disclosure of material information about companies that sell
their stock to the public" through the publication of registration statements
and prospectuses).
170. See generally ALAN GART, REGULATION, DEREGULATION,
REREGULATION: THE FUTURE OF THE BANKING, INSURANCE, AND
SECURITIES INDUSTRIES 37 (1994).
171. Id. at 44.
172. Id. at 42. See also Michael E. Schoeman, The First Amendment and
Restrictions on Advertising of Securities Under the Securities Act of 1933, 41
BUS. LAW. 377, 381 (1986) ("Two related but separable government interests
are suggested by the Act's 1933 legislative history: the promotion of market
efficiency and the prevention of fraud or deception.").
173. GART, supra note 170, at 43.
174. See e.g., Lloyd L. Drury, 1II, Disclosure Is Speech: Imposing
Meaningful First Amendment Constraints on SEC Regulatory Authority, 58
S.C. L. REV. 757 (2007); Antony Page, Taking Stock of the First Amendment's
Application to Securities Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 789 (2007); Edward T.
Highberger, Note, Not so Fast! Scrutinizing the "Gun Jumping" Provisions of
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instruments that affect the general population and are of public
concern.' Thus, the Act demonstrates a concrete hesitation to
employ the First Amendment when the underlying issuer is
involved in practices harmful to the public-such as exaggerated
capitalization and harmful fee structures-by requiring registration
statements and prospectuses that achieve greater transparency.
Even a public policy-oriented approach may warrant outright
regulation of rating agencies (and thus outright denial of First
Amendment protection) in light of the current financial crisis,
which, in some respects, can be equated to the Great Depression.116
2. Is the rating process objective?
In general, the potential for hindering objectivity is
particularly high if there is an appearance of bias or actual conflict
of interests. The credit rating process is embedded with conflicts of
interest that have the potential to saturate it with subjectivity, and
these very conflicts have formed the backbone of the litigation
the Securities Act Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 2141 (2008) (discussing the First Amendment's application to the federal
securities laws).
175. The connection between the Securities Act and the rating agencies
prompts an argument that rating agencies be construed as "underwriters"
pursuant to the Securities Act, which defines "underwriter" as "any person
who . . . has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking, or
participates .. in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such undertaking."
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11) (2009). The
argument here is based on the premise that ratings have been instrumental to
the structuring and subsequent marketing of the product to investors. See
Joseph R. Mason & Joshua Rosner, Where Did the Risk Go? How Misapplied
Bond Ratings Cause Mortgage Backed Securities and Collateralized Debt
Obligation Market Disruptions 14 (May 3, 2007) (Hudson Inst. Working
Paper), available at http://wp.hudson.org/files/publications/Hudson Mortgage-
Paper5_3 07.pdf (discussing how rating agencies could be considered
underwriters of securities and thus subject to the rules and regulations
mandated by the Securities Act of 1933).
176. See GART, supra note 170, at 33-37 (describing the effects of the
Great Depression and noting what seems to resemble the foundations of our
current economic crisis: "The more actively these financial institutions piled
assets on a shaky foundation of faith and credit, the less thoroughly they
researched or acknowledged the underlying values of those assets.").
against the rating agencies. The two conflicts of interest addressed
in Abu Dhabi-the compensation received by rating agencies and
the level of the agency's participation in structuring certain
products-distinguish rating agencies from journalists and justify
the denial of First Amendment protection to rating agencies."'
This conclusion does not prevent rating agencies from asserting
other possible defenses. Yet because of the existence and potency
of the conflicts of interest embedded in the rating process, basing a
defense on First Amendment grounds skirts the bedrock principles
of free communication that the First Amendment is intended to
uphold and is, thus, an improper defense.
The fees charged and obtained by the rating agencies in
Abu Dhabi demonstrate one conflict of interest that may, in fact,
prejudice rating agencies' assessments and distinguish them from
editorials. 78 The compensation structure in Abu Dhabi was based
on the "launch" of the product, where the rating agency would
receive fees "in the range of 10 or more basis points (or one tenth
of 1 percent) at the 'launch' of the [product]. Assuming a $3 billion
launch value, the Rating Agencies would have been paid $6
million." 179 In defense against the plaintiffs' claim that the rating
agencies "stepped far outside their historical role of gathering
information and publishing independent unsolicited ratings,"8 " the
defendants relied on precedent established in Compuware, which
177. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F.
Supp. 2d 155, 166-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). See also GART, supra 170, at 11-12
(discussing the various conflicts of interest embedded in the rating process and
potential solutions to eliminate and/or mitigate these conflicts).
178. First Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 15.
179. Id. Additionally, ongoing fees would be paid to the rating agency,
some in the form of annual fees. This factor is not confined to the types of
securities noted in the Abu Dhabi case, although it may be higher with SIVs,
but the fees are charged regardless of the type of security. See Husisian, supra
note 24, at 425-27 (detailing the "economics" of the ratings agency business as
it relates to the various financial products).
180. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss at 37, Abu Dhabi, 651 F. Supp. 2d 155 (No.
1:08-cv-07508).
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afforded the rating agency First Amendment protection. 8 1
However, this reliance is misplaced since the Compuware holding
targeted the rating agencies' burden of proving actual malice in
assigning the rating rather than targeting corollary elements of the
rating process, such as the compensation structure. 182
Because the issuer (as opposed to the investor) pays the
agency,"" questions inevitably arise as to whether the rating agency
is motivated by profit and whether that profit is the driving force
behind the ratings it issues.'84 This potential for exploitation of the
ratings process for profit may be a result of a rating agency's ability
to "exercise market power,"'' 5 where "dependence of rating
agencies on revenues from the companies they rate could induce
them to rate issuers more liberally," thereby acting as a
mechanism to attract more issuers to use that rating agency.
Furthermore, assigning a lower rating will most likely prevent
issuers from selling the product to many investors,18 1 which would
presumably provide a greater incentive to issue a higher rating in
181. Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Investor Servs., 499 F.3d 520 (6th Cir.
2007).
182. Id. at 533-34.
183. See supra Part II; see also ROLE OF RATINGS, supra note 160, at 14-
16 (discussing the current fee structure wherein the issuer approaches the
rating agency and pays a fee for the rating of its particular financial product; a
clear shift from the "investor pays" model); White, supra note 36, at 49
(same).
184. See OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 32, at 41
n.111 (discussing a corollary to the fees conflict arising "in the context of
underwriters attempting to influence the credit rating process. A large
percentage of bond offerings are underwritten by a few large firms, and the
potential exists ... to rate a particular underwriter's clients more favorably in
return for future business.").
185. White, supra note 62, at 17-18 (detailing the revenues amassed by
Moody's between 1995-2000. During that period, Moody's net income was
$88.2 million and total assets were $217.8 million, values which the author
termed "breathtaking"). See also ROLE OF RATINGS, supra note 160, at 25
("Issuer-paid fees may thus encourage rating agencies to act in the issuer's
rather than the investors' interest, resulting in initial ratings being more
favourable or downgraded less often than they otherwise should be.").
186. OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 32, at 41.
187. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F.
Supp. 2d 155, 164-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
order to amass profits. The conflict created by this compensation
structure becomes more prevalent because the rating analysts'
compensation is tied to revenue growth. 8" As the Managing
Director of the Structured Finance Department at R.W. Pressprich
& Co. stated in his testimony before the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, "whenever a rating analyst is
supervised by a manager whose compensation is determined by
market share or revenue growth (rather than ratings accuracy), the
objectivity of ratings is compromised." 89
Although a rating agency's First Amendment rights cannot
be denied solely because it charges a fee for its services or because
of the resulting conflict of interest, this compensation structure does
place a dagger in the common defense that rating agencies are
comparable to journalists,'9' since journalists are not paid fees by
their subjects.
Addressing the conflict of interest created by rating
agencies' payment for their services, the Abu Dhabi court also
referred to the rating agencies' involvement in structuring the
product through their assistance in determining the level and
amount of financial investment needed for the issuer to obtain the
highest rating. 9' As the court noted, the rating agencies'
188. Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: The Role of the Credit Rating
Agencies, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 110th Cong. 5 (2008) (testimony of Arturo Cifuentes, Managing
Director, Structured Finance Department, R.W. Pressprich & Co.), available
at http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&
FileStoreid=7bffae5c-6a96-4a06-b43b-a15132222f60 (discussing the conflicts
inherent in the rating agency process and the solutions that should be
implemented immediately to mitigate those conflicts).
189. Id.
190. Newby v. Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 825 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
The court, addressing the fact that the rating agencies were paid by the issuer
to provide a rating and the agency, in return, provided a positive one, noted
"there is a question whether the ... conflict of interest ... precludes or limits
First Amendment protection of the ratings." Id. at 825. The court noted
further that not only was the rating disseminated "to the world," but was also
a rating applicable to a large, "powerful public corporation." Id. at 820. See
also Coffee testimony, supra note 165 (referring to this relationship as the
"Built-In Conflict of the 'Issuer Pays' Model").
191. Abu Dhabi, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 166-67.
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involvement in the "structuring" of the notes presented another
stark contrast to the role played by journalists, since this type of
involvement clearly demonstrated a clear departure from the
traditional "role as an unbiased reporter."' 9' 2 Specifically, the rating
agencies had the responsibility to "(1) oversee the [issuer's]
investments; (2) facilitate the purchase of safe and highly-rated
assets; [and] (3) acquire and manage the [note's] underlying
portfolio [in order to justify] the high credit ratings assigned." 93
The level of the rating agencies' participation in assigning a
rating to a structured product, like that in Abu Dhabi, is in the
"[d]eal origination . . . [which] involves obtaining implicit
structuring advice by the rating agencies . . . and subsequently
engag[ing] in an iterative dialogue with the agencies in order to
finalize these structures."' 1 4 This type of involvement in structured
product transactions occurs through the rating of the individual
"tranche ... , [which] reflects a judgment about both the credit
quality of the underlying collateral asset pool and the extent of
credit support that must be provided through the transaction's
structure in order for the tranche to receive the rating targeted by
the deal's arrangers."195
192. Id. at 166.
193. Id. at 167.
194. ROLE OF RATINGS, supra note 160, at 2. The report discussed the
main differences between the ratings process for structured products and
other securities. In a structured product, "each tranche reflects a different
position in the deal's capital structure .... As a result, rating agencies.., and
investors need to understand not only the default risk embodied in the
collateral pool but also other, 'non-default' risks . . . that are unrelated to
defaults ... but which affect the credit risk of the tranches-arising from the
transaction's structure." Id. at 14. See generally TIMOTHY J. RIDDIOUGH &
RISHARNG CHIANG, COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES: AN
EXPLORATION INTO AGENCY, INNOVATION, INFORMATION, AND LEARNING IN
FINANCIAL MARKETS 1, 7 (2003) ("Instead of assuming a passive credit quality
certification role, the rating agency actively controls security architecture and
[is] instrumental in determining product design standards . . . . Rating
agencies actively control security design through their determination of
subordination levels required to achieve particular security rating outcomes.").
195. ROLE OF RATINGS, supra note 160, at 2. The report also noted
"[s]tructured finance instruments can be defined through three key
characteristics: (1) pooling of assets ...(2) tranching of liabilities that are
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This conflict was highlighted by the court in Fitch and, most
importantly, was analogized to the journalist-the extent and
concentration of the credit rating agency's participation in the
structuring, as it related to the issuer's product and subsequent
rating, was a clear indication that the relationship would be
considered atypical if applied to media. 96 Even assuming as true
the claim that the rating agency's objective in assigning a rating is
not influenced by its participation in the creation of the product, the
fact that the agency has a reputational risk attributable to the
rating1' 7 leads to the same conclusion: a rating is not objective.
Unlike a journalist, the rating agency becomes involved in the
means to achieve the ends, and its reputational risk is tied to the
product.'"9 If a viable argument is to be made that a rating is like an
editorial and should be afforded protection under the First
Amendment, then the characteristics of the rating process should
be similar to, if not the same as, those of the editorial process: void
of innate conflicts of interest that can visibly hinder impartiality.
Alternatively, by extending the argument that the rating
agency is intimately involved in the construction of a structured
backed by the asset pool ... (3) de-linking of the credit risk of the collateral
asset pool from the credit risk of the originator ... ." Id. at 1. Furthermore,
the credit rating of these structured products, and their corresponding
investment tranches which are individually rated, has been dominated by three
rating agencies: Moody's, Fitch, and Standard & Poor's. Id. at 2. See also
Darcy, supra note 26, at 616 ("Securities [are divided] into senior, mezzanine,
and subordinated/equity tranches according to credit risk to provide securities
that match the varying risk preferences of different investors. Typically, the
issuer pays a [credit rating agency] to rate the senior and mezzanine
tranches.").
196. Fitch, Inc. v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc., 330 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir.
2003) (emphasis added).
197. See Sy, supra note 161, at 6 (noting that rating agencies "stress the
paramount importance of safeguarding their reputation for issuing objective
and credible ratings. They claim that reputational concerns should reduce
issuer influence .... ).
198. See Grais & Katsiris, supra note 124, at 3, n.22 ("[Tlhe most
important factor in determining whether [Moody's] is qualified to assert the
journalist's privilege is the nature of [Moody's] relationship with the alleged
'source.') (citing Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Investors Servs., Inc., 324 F.
Supp. 2d 860, 862 (E.D. Mich. 2004)).
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product, a claim could be made that since the rating agency is
assisting the issuer to achieve a higher rating, it is in effect
advertising its rating. Professor Eugene Volokh, in his testimony to
the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurances, and
Government Sponsored Enterprises, briefly entertained this
argument: it could be plausible to deny or limit First Amendment
protection to ratings agencies if they are deemed to be engaging in
commercial advertising. 99 Specifically, Professor Volokh notes that
if the advertisement is "in exchange for positive coverage," it can be
construed as commercial advertising and therefore less deserving of
2WuFirst Amendment protection . Standard & Poor's has stated that
its "ratings and commentary do not propose commercial
transactions, but instead offer opinions.,'2'1 However, if the rating
agency is involved in the financial product's construction to the
extent that it suggests all possible means to achieve the highest
rating (thereby attracting more investors and more revenue), then
the issuer, in a sense, is paying to obtain a positive rating, regardless
of whether the rating is an accurate risk assessment based upon the
information provided by the issuer. Further, the issuer amasses
more revenue as a result of the positive rating, thereby ensuring the
199. Volokh statement, supra note 148, at 5. See also Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servs. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (noting
the adoption of a four-part test in analyzing "commercial speech cases": first,
is it protected under the First Amendment in that it is "lawful" and "not
misleading"; second, is the "governmental interest ... substantial"; third, does
the regulation promote "the governmental interest asserted"; and fourth, is
the regulation "more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest").
200. Volokh statement, supra note 148, at 3. Volokh refers to the
holding in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) and related cases. Id. The pharmacist in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy was merely advertising the prices of
prescription medication and not medication that he had a hand in developing.
The Court concluded that the First Amendment protects "commercial speech"
but did "not hold that [commercial speech] can never be regulated in any
way." Virginia State Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 770. See also supra note 99
and accompanying text.
201. Memorandum from Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP on Behalf of
Standard & Poor's 10 (July 2005), available at http://www2.standardand
poors.com/spf/pdf/media/Exhibit-2.pdf (addressing the constitutionality of the
Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act, H.R. 2990, 109th Cong. (2005)).
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return of the issuer to the same rating agency for its next financial
product rating. If the rating agency is so intensely involved, how
can it not be endorsing a commercial transaction in which it has a
financial benefit? If this is the case, then not only could the ratings
be deemed commercial advertising, but the journalist analogy is
further attenuated.
In his testimony, Professor Volokh concluded that "[s]o
long as the payment isn't buying a positive evaluation -so long as
the speaker isn't proposing a commercial transaction in which it
itself has a financial interest ... the evaluation will remain fully
constitutionally protected."2"2  The negative implication of
Professor Volokh's testimony is clear: if the payment is buying a
positive evaluation, then that is considered commercial advertising,
which is less deserving of protection under the First Amendment.
The process that rating agencies use in determining the
viability of a product in case of default is saturated with the effects
of two distinct conflicts of interest that cloud the objectivity of the
rating. Allowing the rating to be subjectively assigned, even
unintentionally, can prove detrimental not only to the direct
purchaser of the product but also to the global financial market if
the assigned risk is deemed inaccurate. It is this impact on the
public that warrants a denial or limitation on ratings' First
Amendment protection.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Rating agencies have demonstrated that they are integral to
the inner workings of the financial sector by issuing useful, and
even necessary, information to investors and issuers.4 3 As a result
2114
of this reliance on ratings, particularly high ratings, the few rating
202. Volokh statement, supra note 148, at 3 (emphasis added).
203. See Two Thumbs Down, supra note 1, at 629-30 (discussing the
"supply" of the ratings issued by the credit ratings agencies to counter of the
"demand" investors and issuers).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
494 [Vol. 8
2010]OBSTACLES TO CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 495
agencies that are predominantly used z2 5 have formed a monopoly.
This barrier to entry is further buttressed by the SEC's "NRSRO"
designation. The labeling of certain ratings agencies as NRSROs
has cultivated public reliance on the three main rating agencies.20 6
Concurrently, achieving NRSRO status ensures transparency in the
rating agency process in light of the conflicts of interest. The shift
to the issuer-pays model117 (the most prominent conflict in the
rating process) has sparked the strong presumption that rating
agencies' pecuniary interest has outweighed their objective to
provide transparent, accurate, and independent credit analysis.208
The most pragmatic response to this conflict, as well as the conflict
created by the rating agencies' involvement in structuring the
product, is not to facilitate private rights of action; instead, the SEC
should continue on the path of regulation by implementing more
stringent safeguards that will increase market accountability and
reinforce investor confidence. The safeguards suggested below can
be implemented by way of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (WSRCPA) passed by the U.S. House of
Representatives in December 2009.2(9
205. See Egan-Jones Letter, supra note 65 (stating that the only ratings
agencies predominantly used for SIVs are S.&P. and Moody's, which thereby
hold a "partner monopoly").
206. See OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 32, at 24
("Fitch complained that S&P and Moody's were attempting to squeeze them
out of certain structured finance markets by engaging in the practice of
'notching'-lowering their ratings on, or refusing to rate, securities issued by
certain asset pools ... unless a substantial portion of the assets within those
pools were also rated by them. Fitch suggested, as a possible solution, that
NRSROs be required to recognize the ratings of other NRSROs as their own
for purposes of rating these asset pools.").
207. White, supra note 36, at 49.
208. See Husisian, supra note 24, at 424 ("In short, while the rating is a
distilled, independent judgment as to the creditworthiness of a particular debt
issue, it is not an audit. The information is an important part of an investor's
information, but it does not by itself provide a quick route to high, risk-free
returns.").
209. H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009). See generally DAVIS POLK &
WARDWELL LLP, SUMMARY OF THE WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DEC. 11,
2009, at 26 (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/
Certainly a rating agency is in the best position to
administer its ratings processes; however, allowing an impartial
external party, which has no financial interest in the transaction
between the issuer and the rating agency, to evaluate and
recommend enhancements to the process can only further mitigate
the potential for abuse and impede possible systemic default that
could result from inaccurate categorizations of risk. One solution is
to remove the provision in the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act
of 2006 prohibiting the SEC from "regulat[ing] the substance of
credit ratings or the procedures and methodologies by which [the
NRSROs] determine[] credit ratings.""21 " True, this provision does
increase transparency by keeping the requirement that the rating
agencies disclose their methodologies to the SEC; however, it does
not solidly further the objective of regulating and monitoring the
rating agencies' methodologies and procedures (which are the very
processes of assessing the viability of the underlying issuer's
creditworthiness).2 ' The WSRCPA attempts to solve this problem
by mandating annual SEC audits of "each registered credit rating
agency's ratings, policies, procedures, and methodologies.,
212
Another way to increase market accountability and restore
public confidence is to implement more concrete requirements,
such as requiring the rating agencies to adopt internal operational
audits and issue a final report that would detail, at a minimum, the
ld9db41f-c855-4f46-ac3f ld8bd4007805/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
60af4bfc-fc35-4087-bd32-c0c251b27c08/121509_wallstreetreform.pdf
[hereinafter DAVIS POLK] (summarizing the Consumer Protection Act as
financial reform legislation that attempts, among other things, to protect
consumers and investors, enhance understanding of insurance matters, and
further regulate certain derivatives markets).
210. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120
Stat. 1327, 1332 (2006).
211. See generally Kaswell et al., supra note 74 (providing an overview of
the objectives and effects of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006
and noting that one of the goals of the Credit Agency Reform Act was to
increase transparency). Rating agencies can be expected to claim that this is
akin to the Federal Communication Commission regulating television news,
but in reality, the more apt comparison is to the Federal Trade Commission's
recent regulation of the disclosure that bloggers must provide regarding their
financial ties to products they review.
212. See DAVIS POLK, supra note 209, at 27.
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adequacy of the ratings procedures."' These audits could prove
instrumental in uncovering potential inconsistencies in the ratings
process and identifying potential conflicts of interest. The
provisions set forth in the WSRCPA that support this solution
require that "rating agencies . . . establish, maintain, and enforce
written procedures and methodologies and an internal control
system ... to ensure that ratings are clear and consistent.
2 1 4
As noted, the consequences of the shift to the "issuer pays"
model 21 have allowed for the potential of subjectivity to cloud the
rating process. As Professor John Coffee stated before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, "agencies are
a watchdog paid by the persons they are to watch. '' 21 6 To address
this conflict, regulations could be implemented that limit the
amount of compensation received by the issuer, or that impose
heightened disclosure requirements (to investors and the SEC)
when fees exceed a certain dollar amount. 2 7 Facing a cap on the
amount of revenues that can be obtained from an issuer in any
given year, the rating agencies will be less inclined to assist the
issuers in obtaining a higher rating in exchange for their services.
Once again, the WSRCPA addresses this concern, requiring the
agency to institute "extensive conflicts of interest guidelines,
including certain revenue disclosure ... and a prohibition on certain
non-rating products or services., 28 Further mitigating the conflict
213. This process would equate to that which is imposed upon Registered
Investment Advisers. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Compliance
Procedures and Practices, 17 C.F.R § 275.206(4)-7.
214. See DAVIS POLK, supra note 209, at 29.
215. U.S. SEC, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE
COMMISSION STAFF'S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
23 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination07
0808.pdf.
216. Coffee testimony, supra note 165, at 2.
217. See OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 32, at 41
("[T]he dependence of rating agencies on revenues ... could induce them to
rate issuers more liberally, and . . . [t]his potential conflict could be
exacerbated by the rating agencies' practice of charging fees based on the size
of the issuance, as large issuers could be given inordinate influence with the
rating agencies.").
218. See DAVIS POLK, supra note 209, at 28.
imposed by the compensation arrangement, the Act allows for
"[r]egistration exemption[s] . . . to any credit rating agency that
does not provide credit ratings to issuers for a fee and issues credit
ratings only in certain publications of general and regular
circulation."2 '19
Although the WSRCPA has not yet been passed by the
Senate, it is a huge step toward market efficiency, accountability,
and transparency-all characteristics essential to investor
protection.
CONCLUSION
There is no question that rating agencies must expose and
assign risk to financial instruments. In the current economic crisis,
in which many investors suffered losses as a result of investing in
financial instruments with incorrectly categorized risk ratings, it has
become natural to assign blame to anyone remotely connected to
the creation and dissemination of those financial products,
including ratings agencies. In response to these attacks, the
agencies have claimed First Amendment protection for the ratings
they have issued.
Yet suits brought against rating agencies have demonstrated
that it is debatable whether agencies can truthfully provide
impartial assessments of risk while being heavily compensated for
their services or, at times, being involved in the structuring of the
products they are hired to rate. Further, although it may be
instinctive to blame a rating agency, since it can be perceived as the
authority on the riskiness of a product, like any other corporation,
it has a reputation to uphold, one that is positively correlated to the
accurate ratings it issues. The resulting litigation surrounding these
ratings reveals that courts have taken opposing stances on whether
to grant First Amendment protection to the ratings. However, as a
matter of normative law, extending First Amendment protection to
ratings has placed, and continues to place, our financial
infrastructure at risk.
219. See id at 27.
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The First Amendment is not the appropriate tool with
which to address the concerns posed by rating agencies, particularly
taking into consideration that these agencies are indeed regulated
(even if inadequately) by the SEC. The solution to these issues is
heightened regulation. Yet, until an appropriate context is
adopted, the public will continue to feel the burden that the current
irresolution places prospectively upon the vitality of the global
economy and retrospectively upon the historical underpinnings of
the First Amendment itself.
